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This paper deals with credit market imperfections and idiosyncratic risks
in a two–sector heterogeneous agent dynamic general equilibrium model of
occupational choice. We focus especially on the effects of tightening ﬁnan-
cial constraints on macroeconomic performance, entrepreneurial risk–taking,
and social mobility. Contrary to many models in the literature, our compar-
ative static results cover a broad range for borrowing constraints, from an
unrestrained to a perfectly constrained economy. In our baseline model, we
ﬁnd substantial gains in output, welfare, and wealth equality associated with
credit market improvements. The marginal gains from relaxing constraints are
largest for empirically relevant debt–equity ratios. Interestingly, the entrepren-
eurship rate and social mobility respond non–monotonically to a change in the
tightness of ﬁnancial constraints. The results crucially depend on the degree of
income persistence and feedback effects in general equilibrium, where optimal
ﬁrm sizes and the demand for credit are determined endogenously.
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This paper examines the effects of ﬁnancial constraints and idiosyncratic risks in a
dynamic equilibrium model of occupational choice. We determine the qualitative
and quantitative response of aggregate macroeconomic activity, social mobility, and
the wealth distribution to credit market improvements.
Our analysis contributes to recent literature on dynamic stochastic heteroge-
neous agent general equilibrium models concerned with risk and distributional dy-
namics, for instance Quadrini (2000), Meh (2005, 2008), Bohá˘ cek (2006, 2007)
and Cagetti and De Nardi (2006a,b,c). All these contributions share as common
feature that including entrepreneurship and occupational choice into a Huggett
(1993)/Aiyagari (1994)–type economy provides a much better explanation of the
empirically observed wealth inequality, especially in the upper tail of the distri-
bution. The implications of our model regarding wealth inequality are in accor-
dance with this strand of literature, although our focus is more directed towards
the general effects of ﬁnancial constraints and the question of how sensitive the
macroeconomy as a whole responds to a reduction in credit market imperfections.
To this end we develop a model which is more closely related to modern growth
theory. Regarding the role of entrepreneurship, we assume a more sophisticated sec-
toral structure than e.g. Bohá˘ cek (2006) or Cagetti and De Nardi (2006a). We com-
bine occupational choice under risk à la Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979) and Kanbur
(1979a,b) with the two–sector approach of Romer (1990), but without endogenous
growth. In each period of time, the risk–averse agents choose between between
two alternative occupations. They either set up an enterprise in the intermediate
goods industry which is characterized by monopolistic competition. Or, they supply
their labor endowment to the production of a ﬁnal good in a perfectly competitive
market. Producers of the ﬁnal good use capital and labor inputs, and differenti-
ated varieties of the intermediate good. All households are subject to an income
risk. Managerial ability and productivity as a worker follow independent random
processes. Entrepreneurial activity is rewarded with a higher expected income.1
Similar to Lucas (1978), there is no aggregate risk.
The economic performance in the intermediate goods industry cruciallydepends
on two factors: uncertainty and credit constraints. Business owners face an ﬁrm–
speciﬁc productivity shock, and there are no markets for pooling risks. An en-
trepreneurs maximizes his proﬁt if the business operates at the optimal ﬁrm size,
which is endogenously determined and governed by market demand from the ﬁnal
goods industry. For an individual wealth too small to maintain the optimal ﬁrm
size, the ﬁrm–owner would want to borrow the remaining amount on the credit
market, where he might be subject to ﬁnancial constraints. The individual demand
for loans, too, is endogenous. If the entrepreneur is wealthy enough, he operates
1See also Clemens (2006a,b, 2008) and Clemens and Heinemann (2006) for entrepreneurial risk–
taking in a general equilibrium context.
2his business at the proﬁt–maximizing level and supplies the rest of his wealth to the
capital market.
Due to the two–sector general equilibrium nature of our model, the optimal
business size and the demand for credit are endogenously determined, and we do
not have to fall back on ﬁxed investment projects (or entry costs respectively) in
order to analyze the effects of credit market frictions.2 There is no further portfolio
choice in our framework. To this end, our approach draws a simple picture of
the empirical result, stated by Heaton and Lucas (2000), that the entrepreneurial
households’ business wealth on average constitutes a relevant fraction of their total
wealth.
We are especially interested in the question of how tightening (or relaxing) ﬁ-
nancial constraints affects the macroeconomy regarding aggregate output, the sec-
toral allocation of capital and labor, factor prices, the income and wealth distribu-
tion, occupational choice, as well as the between–group mobility of households.
Our comparative static analysis covers a broad range of values for borrowing con-
straints, from an unconstrained to a perfectly constrained economy. This is a novel
approach since many models of the literature consider a ﬁxed debt–equity ratio, or
rest with a comparison of a complete vis–à–vis a speciﬁc incomplete market, or they
focus on the no–credit market scenario.
The model is broadly consistent with macro data from industrialized countries.
Naturally, the model cannot draw a realistic picture of the economy over the entire
domain of ﬁnancial constraints under consideration. For this reason, we deﬁne a
benchmark economy with an empirically plausible debt–equity ratio, and calibrate
the model to match macroeconomic key variables, for instance, for the U.S. and
other OECD members.
We ﬁnd substantial gains of relaxing constraints, amounting to 20% of aggregate
output, and observe likewise improvements in average wealth holdings and welfare.
The associated marginal gains of credit market improvements in the intermediate
goods industry are substantial for debt–equity ratios in the empirically relevant
domain and increasing.
The macroeconomic effects can primarily be attributed to an inefﬁcient allo-
cation of capital across sectors, and only secondly to adjustments in occupational
choice, employment, and the entrepreneurship rate. In moving from an uncon-
strained to a completely credit–constrained economy, the average ﬁrm size drops
down to a mere 50% of optimal business activity. Capital accumulation plays a
twofold role in this context: On the one hand, it endows individuals with the wealth
necessary to set–up and operate a ﬁrm. On the other hand, buffer–stock saving
provides a self–insurance on intertemporal markets against the non–diversiﬁable
income risk. Accordingly, we ﬁnd that wealthier households are more likely to be
2It is a standard approach in the literature to assume entry costs, often combined with a decreasing
returns technology, to generate some kind of ‘monopolistic’ market structure, which is an innate part
of our model.
3members of the entrepreneurial class than poorer ones and there is a marked con-
centration of wealth in the hands of entrepreneurs which is consistent with recent
empirical ﬁndings (cf. Quadrini, 1999; Holtz-Eakin et al., 1994a). Upward mobil-
ity of entrepreneurs in our model is primarily accumulation driven. The riskiness
of entrepreneurial incomes looses its importance for occupational choice once the
household’s income share generated from proﬁts declines relative to his capital in-
come. Nevertheless, in accordance with Hamilton (2000), many entrepreneurs of
our model enter and persist in business despite the fact that they have lower initial
earnings than average wage incomes.
Regarding empirical evidence, there is strong support in the literature for the hy-
pothesis that ﬁnancial constraints are an impediment to entering entrepreneurship;
see Evans and Leighton (1989), Evans and Jovanovic (1989), Holtz-Eakin et al.
(1994b), Blanchﬂower and Oswald (1998), Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen
(2002), and Desai et al. (2003). Gentry and Hubbard (2004) point out that exter-
nal ﬁnancing has important implications for individual investment and saving. This
evidence is challenged by Hurst and Lusardi (2004), who ﬁnd that the likelihood
of entering entrepreneurship relative to initial wealth is ﬂat over a large range of
the wealth distribution and increasing only for higher wealth levels of workers.
The general equilibrium nature of our approach generates surprising and almost
counter–intuitive results regarding the impact of ﬁnancial constraints on occupa-
tional choice under risk. The entrepreneurship rate and social mobility respond
non–monotonically to a change in the tightness of constraints. Because individual
income persistence can be identiﬁed as an important determinant of occupational
choice and mobility, we analyze two settings which only differ with respect to the
serial correlation of the underlying idiosyncratic shocks. The entrepreneurship rate
of the baseline model rises with an increase in credit market efﬁciency, which is in
accordance with economic intuition. If, however, the persistence of entrepreneurial
talent shocks is reduced, we predominantly observe a decline in the entrepren-
eurship rate. This outcome can primarily be attributed to the general equilibrium
nature of our model.
Wealth inequality is not necessarily reduced, if we relax borrowing constraints.
Regarding social mobility, the response to changes in credit availability also is non–
monotonic. In general we ﬁnd that workers and entrepreneurs with high individual
productivity tend to remain in their present occupation, whereas low productivity
individuals are more likely to switch professions.
Regarding the functional distribution of income, we ﬁnd that credit constraints
have a redistributive effect by raising the proﬁt income share at the cost of capital
incomes. The results indicate that the stochastic nature of the underlying idio-
syncratic shocks also plays an important role for the explanation of the general
equilibrium effects of credit market imperfections.
Recent contributions in this area of research suffer from several shortcomings
which our approach aims to overcome. In Quadrini (2000), occupational choice
4and the level of entrepreneurship is (more or less) entirely governed by the under-
lying productivity shocks. Li (2002) and Bohá˘ cek (2006) discuss economies with
a single sector of production which does not allow for factor movements between
industries and therefore neglects factor substitution. In our model, producers of
the intermediate and the ﬁnal good are subject to competition, especially with re-
spect to capital demand. Our approach does not have ﬁxed entry costs (in terms
of discrete investment projects) of entrepreneurship as in Ghatak et al. (2001),
Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2003) or Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006). Instead,
we have an endogenously determined optimal ﬁrm size and no discontinuities in
individual credit demand. Occupational choice, entrepreneurial activity and per-
formance crucially depend on monopoly proﬁts, market shares and relative factor
scarcity in the two sectors of production. Also different to Cagetti and De Nardi
(2006a) or Kitao (2008), the entrepreneurs of our economy are essential for aggre-
gate output. As will become obvious below, the interdependence of sectors is impor-
tant for the general equilibrium results on occupational choice, between–group mo-
bility and the income and wealth distribution, and contributes to the understanding
of how ﬁnancial constraints affect the macroeconomy.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 develops the two–sector model. We
describe the equilibrium associated with a stationary earnings and wealth distribu-
tion. Since the formal structure of the model does not allow for analytical solu-
tions, we perform numerical simulations of a calibrated model in order to examine
the general equilibrium effects of an increase in the tightness of credit constraints.
Section 3 gives information on the calibration procedure and related empirical ev-
idence. Section 4 discusses the simulation results. Section 5 concludes. Technical
details are relegated to the Appendix.
2 The Model
2.1 Overview
We consider a neoclassical growth model with two sectors of production. Draw-
ing from Quadrini (2000) and Romer (1990), we consider a corporate sector with
perfectly competitive large ﬁrms who hire capital and labor services and use an
intermediate good in order to produce a homogeneous output which can be con-
sumed or invested respectively. The intermediate goods industry (non–corporate
sector) consists of a large number of small ﬁrms operating under the regime of
monopolistic competition. Each ﬁrm in this sector is owned and managed by an
entrepreneur. Both sectors of production are essential.
Market activity in the intermediate goods industry is constrained. In order to
run the business at the proﬁt–maximizing ﬁrm size, entrepreneurs either possess
sufﬁcient wealth of their own, or they need to compensate for their lack of eq-
uity by borrowing on the credit market, where they might be subject to borrowing
5constraints. The two–sector setting allows us to endogenously relate ﬁnancial con-
straints to individual characteristics and overall market activity.
The economy is populated by a continuum [0,1] of inﬁnitely–lived households,
each endowed with one unit of labor.3 In each period of time, individuals follow
their occupation predetermined from the previous period and make a decision re-
garding their future profession, which is either to become producers of the inter-
mediate good or to supply their labor services to the production of the ﬁnal good.
Labor efﬁciency as well as entrepreneurial productivity are idiosyncratic random
variables. Regarding the associated income risk, we assume that wage incomes are
less risky than proﬁt incomes. There is no aggregate risk.
With respect to the timing of events, we assume that individual occupational
choice takes place before the resolution of uncertainty. Once the draw of nature
has occurred, entrepreneurs as well as workers in the ﬁnal goods sector know their
individual productivity. Those monopolists, who now discover their own wealth
being too low to operate at the optimal ﬁrms size, will express their capital demand
on the credit market, probably become subject to credit–constraints, and then start
production. After labor and proﬁt income is realized, the households decide on
how much to consume and to invest. There is no capital income risk and no risk of
production in the corporate sector.
2.2 Final Goods Sector
The representative ﬁrm of the ﬁnal goods sector produces a homogeneous good
Y using capital KF, labor L, and varieties of an intermediate good x(i),i ∈ [0,l] as
inputs. Production in this sector takes place under perfect competition and the









x(i)a di , 0 < a < 1, 0 < g < 1 . (1)
Each type of intermediate good employed in the production of the ﬁnal good is
identiﬁed with one monopolistic producer in the intermediate goods sector. Con-
sequently, the number of different types is identical with the population share l
of entrepreneurs in the population. The number of entrepreneurs is determined
endogenously through occupational choices of the agents, which will be described
below. Additive–separability of (1) in intermediate goods ensures that the marginal
product of input i is independent of the quantity employed of i′  = i. Intermediate
goods are close but not perfect substitutes in production.
3It would be a straightforward extension of the model to include the life–cycle dimension, inter-
generational altruism and bequests as in De Nardi (2004), Cagetti and De Nardi (2006a), or issues
of ﬁrm growth, but this is beyond the scope of the present paper.
4All macroeconomic variables are time–dependent. For notational convenience, we will drop the
explicit time–notation unless necessary. If needed, the ′ symbol denotes next period variables.
6The proﬁt of the representative ﬁrm in the ﬁnal goods sector, pF, is given in
each period by
pF =Y −wL−(r+d)KF −
Z l
0
p(i)x(i) di , (2)
where p(i) denotes the price of intermediate good i. We further assume physical
capital to depreciate over time at the constant rate d, such that the interest factor
is given by R = 1+r−d. Optimization yields the proﬁt maximizing factor demands


















The monopolistic producer of intermediate good x(i) faces the isoelastic demand
function (5), where the direct price elasticity of demand is given by −1/(1−a).
Condition (4) describes aggregate labor demand in efﬁciency units. Equation (3) is
the ﬁnal good sector demand for capital services.
2.3 Intermediate Goods Sector
The intermediate goods sector consists of the population fraction l of entrepren-
eurs who self–employ their labor endowment by operating a monopolistic ﬁrm.
Each monopolist produces a single variety i of the differentiated intermediate good
by employing capital from own wealth and borrowed resources according to the
identical constant returns to scale technology of the form
x(i) = q(i)e k(i) . (6)
Firm owners are heterogeneous in terms of their talent as entrepreneurs. They
differ with respect to the realization of an idiosyncratic productivity shock q(i)e
which is assumed to be non–diversiﬁable and uncorrelated across ﬁrms. We will
give more details on the properties of the shock below. Entrepreneurs hire capital
after the draw of nature has occurred. The ﬁrm problem essentially is a static one.
Under perfect competition of the capital market, the producer treats the rental rate
to capital as exogenously given and maximizes his proﬁt
p(k(i),q(i)e) = p(i)x(i)−(r+d)k(i) . (7)
Utilizing the demand function for intermediate good type–i, (5), and the pro-
duction technology (6), the optimal ﬁrm decision can be expressed in terms of the
7optimal ﬁrm size k(i)∗, given by:













Because capital demand takes place after the draw of nature has occurred, there is
no individual capital risk and no under–employment of input factors. The optimal
ﬁrm size increases with random individual productivity q(i)e, such that more pro-
ductive business owners demand more capital on the capital market. The aggregate
labor input in efﬁciency units determines the optimal ﬁrm size by means of the de-
mand function for intermediate good type i. Aggregate employment is a weighted
average and depends on the size of the labor force 1−l, i.e. the population fraction
of agents choosing the occupation of a worker, and the idiosyncratic shock on labor
productivity qw. The larger the labor force 1−l, the higher—ceteris paribus—will
be aggregate employment L. This goes along with fewer monopolists in the inter-
mediate goods industry, less competition, and a larger market share, as measured
by the optimal ﬁrm size.
2.4 Incomes and Equilibrium Income Shares in the Unconstrained Economy
Households derive income from three sources: labor income, capital income and
monopolistic proﬁts. The technology parameters a and g determine the division
of aggregate income among the three income sources in the absence of ﬁnancial
constraints on entrepreneurial activity. According to marginal productivity theory,
we obtain from (1) a labor share of (1−a)(1−g) and a capital share of (1−a)g.
The remaining income share a accrues to the two types of income generated in the
intermediate goods sector, and splits on proﬁts with a(1−a) and capital income
with a2, respectively, such that the economy–wide capital share amounts to (1−
a)g+a2.
2.5 Capital Market and Financial Constraints
Firms of the ﬁnal goods sector and the intermediate goods industry differ with re-
spect to access to ﬁnancial markets. While the ﬁrst are not constrained in their
ﬁnancing, the latter face greater difﬁculties in diversifying the risk from their en-
trepreneurial activities and, moreover, are subject to borrowing constraints. En-
trepreneurs of the intermediate goods industry, who are wealth–constrained in op-
erating their business at the optimal size (8), seek external ﬁnancing from ﬁnan-
cial intermediaries. The credit market is imperfect with respect to lenders not be-
ing able to enforce loan–repayment due to limited commitment of borrowers (cf.
Banerjee and Newman, 1993). In order not to default on loan contracts, borrowing
amounts are limited, and individual wealth acts as collateral. We do not explic-
itly model ﬁnancial intermediaries and assume that there is no difference between
borrowing and lending rates.
8In case of default, the ﬁnancial intermediator is able to seize a fraction of the
borrowers gross capital income (1+r)a(i). Alternatively, one could assume the
entrepreneur’s proﬁt income to act as collateral. The major difference between the
two approaches is that, in the ﬁrst case, borrowing amounts are entirely determined
by the debtors individual wealth a(i), whereas in the second, they also depend on
his entrepreneurial talent q(i)e, which might be private information.5
The creditor will lend to the borrower only the amount consistent with the bor-
rower’s incentive–compatibility constraint, such that it is in the borrower’s interest
to repay the loan, and there is no credit default in equilibrium.
Let k(i) = a(i)+b(i) be the ﬁrm size an entrepreneur is able to operate at from
own wealth a(i) and borrowed resources b(i). This operating capital k(i) is not
necessarily equal to the optimal ﬁrm size k(i)∗ determined in (8). An entrepreneur
with individual wealth a(i) lower than k(i)∗ will consider loans from the credit
market k(i)∗ −a(i). In case of k(i) < k(i)∗ the ﬁrm faces a borrowing constraint.
Incentive–compatibility requires a self–enforcing contract. It is never optimal for
the borrower to default, if
p(i)+(1+r)a(i) > p(i)+b(i)(1+r)+(1−f)(1+r)a(i)
which reduces to
b(i) 6 fa(i) . (9)
The borrowing amount is limited such that the maximum possible loan is propor-
tional to the borrowers individual wealth a(i). The parameter f is a measure for the
extent to which a lender can use the borrower’s wealth income as collateral. Credit
constraints become less tight with rising f and vanish for large f. The limiting cases
consequently reﬂect the two cases of either complete enforceability (f → ¥) or no
enforceability (f = 0), such that in the ﬁrst case the borrower is considered solvent,
whereas in the second one he is not.
Using the collateral constraint in the entrepreneurial budget constraint yields
k(i) 6 (1+f)a(i). The operating ﬁrm size k(i) of entrepreneur i with productivity
q(i)e and wealth a(i) can then be written as:
k(q(i)e,a(i)) = min[k(i)∗,(1+f)a(i)] . (10)
The subsequent numerical analysis shows that the high–productivity entrepreneurs
are more likely to be constrained than the low–productivity ones, because the opti-
mal ﬁrm size and henceforth the capital demand increase in the productivity shock.
An entrepreneur, whose individual wealth exceeds the level needed to operate
his business at the optimal ﬁrm size will lend the amount a(i)−k(i)∗ on the capi-
tal market at the equilibrium interest rate. The supply side of the capital market
5The qualitative implications for the model are identical under both assumptions. If borrowing
amounts also depend on entrepreneurial productivity, the response to an increase in the tightness in
ﬁnancial constraints is smaller in magnitude. The results are available from the authors upon request.
9altogether consists of those entrepreneurs whose wealth exceeds their individual
optimal ﬁrm size and of workers, who supply their savings. On the demand side
we have the credit–constrained entrepreneurs and ﬁrms from the ﬁnal goods indus-
try. From this follows immediately that the size of the intermediate goods industry
relative to the ﬁnal goods sector essentially depends on occupational choice and
individual wealth accumulation, both determined endogenously in equilibrium.
2.6 Idiosyncratic Risks
In each period of time, workers are endowed with one unit of raw labor and are
subject to an idiosyncratic shock qw affecting labor supply in efﬁciency units, and
exposing each of them to an uninsurable income risk. We assume that labor produc-
tivity qw evolves according to a ﬁrst–order Markov process with h = 1,...,H states,
and qw,h > 0. The transition matrix associated with the Markov process is Pw.
Entrepreneurial productivity qe also evolves according to a ﬁrst–order Markov
process with h = 1,...,H different states qe,1,...,qe,H; qe,h > 0, and transition prob-
ability Pe. Since agents can be either workers or entrepreneurs, it is possible to
identify the occupational status of an agent with his productivity in the respective
occupation. We assume worker productivities to be more evenly distributed than
managerial skills, such that proﬁt incomes in general are more risky than wage
incomes. As is well–known from the literature, entrepreneurs on average are com-
pensated with a positive income differential (aka ‘risk premium’) for bearing the
production risk.
By modeling two distinct random processes for workers and entrepreneurs, we
take into account that the two professions demand different talents, for instance
speciﬁc managerial skills. We assume the processes qw and qe to be uncorrelated,
such that for an individual the conditional expectation of entrepreneurial produc-
tivity is independent of the labor efﬁciency, if employed as a worker. A high produc-
tivity as a worker in the present does not necessarily indicate an equivalently high
future productivity as an entrepreneur, if the individual should decide to switch be-
tween occupations in the next period. The associated probabilities are summarized
in a H ×H transition matrices Pj,j′ describing the transition from productivity state
qj,h to state qj′,h′ for h,h′ = 1,...,H, j = e,w and j  = j′.
As the subsequent analysis will show, assuming different degrees of income
persistence crucially affects the pattern of how occupational choice interacts with
a change in the magnitude of ﬁnancing constraints. If the income process is highly
persistent, then e.g. lowly productive workers and entrepreneurs are more likely
to be lowly productive in the future. The individual can infer from his present
productivity how his future productivity in the same occupation probably will be.
We consider two different speciﬁcations regarding the Markov processes for
entrepreneurial talent and worker efﬁciency respectively. By assuming a high
(medium) serial correlation for entrepreneurs (workers) in our baseline model,
10we are able to generate results which closely match empirical ﬁndings regarding
the macroeconomic key variables and the wealth distribution. In the second setting
we customize the persistence of entrepreneurial income processes to match those
for workers, and focus on the effects on occupational choice and social mobility.
2.7 Intertemporal Decision and Occupational Choice






btU[ct(i)] 0 < b < 1 .
E0 is the expectation operator conditional on information at date 0 and b is the
discount factor. Individuals are assumed to be identical with respect to their pref-








for r > 0,r  = 1
lnc(i) for r = 1 ,
where r denotes the Arrow/Pratt measure of relative risk aversion.
Besides intertemporal consumption choice, the single household also makes a
decision on his future occupation in each period, which is either to become a self–
employed producer of an intermediate good in the monopolistically competitive
market or to inelastically supply his labor services in efﬁciency units to the produc-
tion of the ﬁnal good. Occupational choice, once made, is irreversible in the same
period.
LetVw(a(i),q(i)w) denote the optimal value function of an agent currently being
a worker with wealth a, who is in a given productivity state qw. If he decides to re-
main a worker, his productivity evolves according to the transition matrix Pw of the
underlying Markov process. If, instead, he becomes an entrepreneur in the follow-
ing period, he gets a new draw q′
e from the invariant distribution of entrepreneurial
productivities. The next period productivity is determined by the transition matrix
Pw,e (see model calibration below).
There are no markets for pooling idiosyncratic risks. In addition to the ﬁnancial
constraints of the intermediate goods industry, we also have incomplete insurance
markets. There is limited scope to which agents are able to smooth their intertem-
poral consumption ﬂow by borrowing and lending. The standard approach of the
literature is to assume that individual asset holdings are bounded from below. In
what follows, we assume a lowest possible wealth level of a = 0.























s.t. a(i)′ = (1+r)a(i)+q(i)ww−c(i) .
(11)
q is a boolean variable which takes on the values 0 or 1, depending on whether or
not the agent decides to switch between occupations. r and w denote the equilib-
rium returns to capital and labor in efﬁciency units, which are constant over time
for a stationary distribution of wealth and occupational statuses over agents. The
optimal decision associated with the problem (11) is described by the two decision
rules for individual asset holdings a(i)′
w =Aw(a(i), q(i)w) and the future professional
state q(i)′
w = Qw(a(i), q(i)w).
Let Ve(a(i),q(i)e) denote the maximized value function of an entrepreneur with
wealth a in productivity state qe, who faces a decision problem similar to those of a
worker. If he decides to remain an entrepreneur, his productivity evolves according
to the transition matrix Pe of the underlying Markov process. If, instead, he decides
to switch between occupations by becoming a worker in the next period, his future
productivity q′
w is determined by the transition matrix Pe,w. With k(i)∗ denoting the




















   




Again, q is a boolean variable, indicating the agent’s decision on leaving or remain-
ing in his present occupation. The optimal decision is described by the decision
rules for individual asset holdings a(i)′
e = Ae(a(i), q(i)e) and the future professional
state q(i)′
e = Qe(a(i), q(i)e).6
6Note that the value functions (11) and (12) may not be concave because of the boolean variable
q, indicating binary choice between occupations. Similar to Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2003), we
12In general, our model generates the same implications for individual savings
and wealth accumulation under risk as, for instance, discussed in Aiyagari (1994)
or Huggett (1996). Similar to Quadrini (2000), we additionally consider occupa-
tional choice. Consequently, wealth accumulation plays a two–fold role: On the one
hand, the shocks to worker efﬁciency and entrepreneurial productivity generate an
income risk which households respond to with buffer–stock saving. On the other
hand, higher wealth levels protect entrepreneurs against the danger of being sub-
ject to ﬁnancial constraints. In terms of Sandmo (1970) there is only an income but
no capital risk in our model, such that the share of risky incomes in total household
income declines with growing wealth. Accordingly, the importance of risky prof-
its providing negative incentives towards entrepreneurship fades for high levels of
wealth.
2.8 Stationary Recursive Equilibrium
A stationary recursive competitive general equilibrium is an allocation, where equi-
librium prices generate a distribution of wealth and occupations over agents which
is consistent with these prices given the exogenous process for the idiosyncratic
shocks and the agents’ optimal decision rules.
We obtain aggregate labor supply by summing up individual labor supplies in ef-
ﬁciency units over the population fraction 1−l of workers. The stationary recursive
equilibrium is a set of value functions Vw(a,qw), Ve(a,qe), decision rules Aw(a,qw),
Qw(a,qw) and Ae(a,qe), Qe(a,qe), prices w, r, p(i) and a distribution l,1−l of house-
holds over occupations such that:7
(i) the decision rules Aw(a,qw), Qw(a,qw) and Ae(a,qe), Qe(a,qe) solve the work-
ers’ and entrepreneurs’ problems (11) and (12) at prices w, r, p(i),
(ii) the aggregate demands of consumption, labor, capital and intermediate goods
are the aggregation of individual demands. Factor and commodity markets
clear at constant prices w, r, p(i), where factor inputs are paid according to
their marginal product.
(iii) the stationary distribution G of agents over individual wealth holdings, occu-
pations and associated productivities is the ﬁxed point of the law of motion
which is consistent with the individual decision rules and equilibrium prices.
The distribution l,1−l of agents over occupations is time–invariant.
The decision rules for workers, Aw(a, qw), Qw(a, qw), and entrepreneurs, Ae(a, qe),
Qe(a, qe), together with the stochastic processes for individual labor productivity
would like to stress that the dynamic programming algorithm underlying our computational modeling
does not require concavity but monotonicity to converge to the true value function; see also Bohá˘ cek
(2007, fn. 4).
7See Appendix A for the equilibriumconditions of the discrete formulationof the model underlying
the numerical simulations.
13and entrepreneurial productivity, determine the stationary distribution G at equilib-
rium prices w,r. The stationary distribution G governs the population share of en-
trepreneurs (i.e. the mass of ﬁrms in the intermediate goods sector), the efﬁciency
units of labor supplied by workers, capital demand of the intermediate goods sec-
tor, and the aggregate capital supply, the latter equaling the mean of individual
wealth holdings. Once the population share of entrepreneurs l is derived, this to-
gether with the stationary distribution of entrepreneurial productivities determines
the supply of intermediate goods (for details, see Appendix A).
3 Calibration
In order to evaluate the macroeconomic effects of changes in the tightness of ﬁ-
nancial constraints, our ﬁrst step is to deﬁne a benchmark economy which matches
standard macro data from OECD countries. We calibrate the model to replicate em-
pirical observations regarding the functional and personal distribution of income
and wealth, capital return, entrepreneurship rates, and social mobility. The bench-
mark value for the debt–equity ratio is set to f = 1, i.e., the maximum loan is
limited to half the amount of the operating capital (cf. Evans and Jovanovic, 1989;
Gentry and Hubbard, 2004). Table 1 summarizes the parameterization of the model
and our calibration targets. We ﬁnd that it is sufﬁcient to mimic unlimited access to
credit (f → ¥) in our simulations by choosing the largest value for f = 1000, where
virtually no entrepreneur is restrained.
We adopt a broad notion of entrepreneurship and consider an entrepreneur as
someone, who owns and operates a small business, and who is willing to take risks,
to be innovative, and to exploit proﬁt opportunities (Knight, 1921; Schumpeter,
1930; Kirzner, 1973). Deﬁnitions of self–employment and entrepreneurial activity
differ widely across countries.8 According to the OECD, self–employment encom-
passes “...those jobs, where the remuneration is directly dependent upon the proﬁts
derived from the goods and services produced. The incumbents make the operational
decisions affecting the enterprise, or delegate such decisions while retaining responsi-
bility for the welfare of the enterprise.” (OECD, 2000, Ch. 5, p. 191). Our model gen-
erates self–employment business ownership rates around 20%, which is somewhat
more at the upper range of values for OECD countries (including owner–managers),
matching countries like New Zealand (20.8%), Italy (24.8%), or Spain (18.3%);
see also the annual Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM 2005, Minniti et al.)
for data on total entrepreneurial activity.
Regarding preferences, we set the discount factor b and the coefﬁcient of rela-
tive risk aversion r according to estimates from the literature, in order to generate
equilibrium interest rates on safe assets around 3% which is consistent with em-
pirical ﬁndings (cf. Mehra and Prescott, 1985; Obstfeld, 1994). The parameters of
8Often, the agricultural sector is excluded from the computation of entrepreneurship rates.
14Table 1: Calibration Values for the Baseline Model
Calibrated parameter Calibration target (approx. ) Source
Technology Interest rate r 2–4% (Mehra and Prescott,
1985; Quadrini, 2000) a g d
0.33 0.06 0.1 Factor income shares
labor 0.63 (King and Rebelo,
1999, PSID) Preferences proﬁt 0.22
r b capital 0.15
2.0 0.91
Gini index of wealth 0.75–0.78 (PSID, SCE)
Shocks
sw pw se pe Income persistence pw (Aiyagari, 1994;
Guvenen, 2007, &
references therein)
0.2 0.6 1.8 0.9 0.5–0.9
Financial frictions Entrepreneurship rate 15–25% (GEM, 2005)
f Exit/entry rates 20–35% (Quadrini, 2000; Vale,
2006; Aghion et al.,
2007)
0 ↔ 1000
production technology, a and g, are chosen such as to generate an equilibrium labor
income share of 0.63 which matches empirical observations e.g. for the U.S. econ-
omy (King and Rebelo, 1999) or the average of EU15. The corresponding capital
and proﬁt income shares of the unconstrained economy (f → ¥) are 0.16 and 0.21.
PSID data report a income share for entrepreneursof around 22%. The depreciation
rate is ﬁxed at 6%, which also is a standard choice in the literature.
The steady state of the simulated benchmark economy replicates the Gini co-
efﬁcient of wealth inequality for the U.S. (PSID, 1989) but also matches OECD
countries like Sweden, France, and Switzerland.
To take account of empirically observed income persistence, we assume that the
processes for labor efﬁciency qw and entrepreneurial productivity qe are lognormal
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where e ∼ N (0,1). The process (13) is parameterized following Aiyagari (1994)
with pw = 0.6 and sw = 0.2. With respect to the entrepreneurial income process
(14), our baseline model assumes a higher serial correlation pe = 0.9 and a larger
variance se = 1.8 in order to reproduce the higher risk associated with entrepren-
15eurial activity and to generate empirically plausible exit/entry rates and wealth
inequality. We assume identical correlations pe,w = 0.6 in our second setting to
highlight that occupational choice and social mobility crucially depend on income
persistence.
Entry rates into entrepreneurship equal exit rates in the stationary recursive
equilibrium. Our model is calibrated to generate exit rates of around 4% of the
population (≈ 20% of intermediate industry members) which consistent with the
evidence reported by Quadrini (2000) but higher than the rates documented by
Evans (1987) for the U.S., and also in the upper range of empirically plausible
values for OECD countries (cf. Vale, 2006; Aghion et al., 2007).
The income processes are approximated with a ﬁve–state Markov chain by using
the method described in Tauchen (1986). The transition matrices for individuals
who decide to switch between occupations are derived from the stationary distri-
butions of the Markov processes. The probability for a worker (entrepreneur) of
ending up in a speciﬁc state of entrepreneurial (worker) productivity qe,h (qw,h) is
given by the stationary (unconditional) probabilities of this state. The algorithm for
ﬁnding the equilibrium consists of three nested loops, starting from an initial guess
on factor prices w,r and employment L, then iterating until markets clear and the
conditions of a stationary recursive equilibrium are met (see Appendix A).
4 Results
Our baseline model describes an economy where agents choose between two un-
correlated occupational lotteries with different degrees of income persistence. The
benchmark economy is subject to moderate constraints on the credit market and
calibrated such as to match empirical evidence for the U.S. and other OECD coun-
tries. We now proceed with investigating the effects of a change in the tightness of
ﬁnancial constraints on (a) inequality and the distribution of wealth, (b) on output,
factor prices, and the factor income distribution, and (c) on occupational choice
and social mobility.
A common ﬁnding for models with credit market imperfections is that the prop-
erties of the equilibrium often respond non–monotonically to parameter changes.
If we look at the literature, we ﬁnd models assessing the effects of credit market
imperfections by assuming no credit market at all (e.g. Bohá˘ cek, 2007). Other
approaches compare imperfect to perfect markets.9 As Matsuyama (2007, p. 3)
points out, there is no reason to believe that, ﬁrst, the effects of an imperfect mar-
ket equal those of no credit market, and second, the effects of improving credit mar-
kets are similar to those of completely eliminating market imperfections. Instead of
discussing only a single case by assuming a predetermined magnitude of ﬁnancial
constraint, we vary the tightness of constraints in our simulations to cover the range
9see Matsuyama (2007) and references therein.
16Table 2: Wealth Distribution
Top percentiles (in %)
Gini
1% 5% 10% 20% 30%
PSID 1994 22.6 44.8 59.1 75.9 85.9 0.75
SCF 1992 29.5 53.5 66.1 79.5 87.6 0.78
f = 0 21.95 56.59 72.07 87.79 94.32 0.835
f = 1.0 20.24 54.57 66.60 79.13 86.85 0.774
f = 1000 20.16 56.16 69.61 79.45 85.98 0.770
Source: PSID and SCF data, Quadrini (2000, p. 6)
from no credit market (f = 0) to an unconstrained market (f → ¥).10 Although the
value of f is ﬁxed exogenously, the credit demand as well as the magnitude of ra-
tioning is determined endogenously and depends on ﬁrm speciﬁc factors, such as
optimal business size (8), individual wealth, factor prices and the ability shock.
Regarding the comparative static results, we observe that the properties of the
equilibrium respond sensitive to a change in serial correlation. To gain some un-
derstanding of the underlying forces at work, we contrast the baseline model with
the case of identical serial correlation for the idiosyncratic shocks and ﬁnd reversed
implications of a change in the tightness of constraints for the equilibrium entre-
preneurship rate and mobility.
Our analysis proceeds as follows: We ﬁrst investigate to what extent our model
is able to replicate empirical evidence on wealth distributions. We then examine
how the presence of credit constraints affects the key macroeconomic variables,
such as aggregate output, average ﬁrm size, factor prices and factor income shares
as well as individual incomes, household wealth, and the degree of inequality, the
latter measured by the Gini coefﬁcient. In a next step, we analyze mobility between
occupations.
4.1 Results for the Baseline Model
Distribution of Wealth and Business Size Table 2 reports the percentiles and Gini co-
efﬁcients for household wealth computed from the PSID and SCF (Quadrini, 2000)
and the associated values of our model economy for three different degrees of ﬁ-
nancial constraints, f ∈ {0,1,1000}. Similar to related work by Quadrini (2000),
Cagetti and De Nardi (2006a), and Bohá˘ cek (2006) we ﬁnd that introducing occu-
pational choice into Aiyagari (1994)–type models of uninsurable shocks and bor-
rowing constraints improves the prediction of wealth inequality, especially in the
upper tail of the distribution. Our benchmark model economy (f= 1) replicates the
10Tables 2, 3 and 5 display only selected cases with values for f ∈ {0,1,1000}. Figures 2 and 3
cover a broader range of values for f from our simulations.
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Figure 1: CDF of Firm Size with f→¥ (dashed), f= 1.0 (dotted) and f =0 (solid)
Gini coefﬁcient for the U.S. economy and closely matches the wealth distribution
in the top percentiles.
As can be seen, the presence of ﬁnancial constraints tends to increase the con-
centration of wealth at the top of the wealth distribution. Moreover, we observe an
increase in overall wealth inequality, the Gini coefﬁcient rising by 6.5 p.p.
Regarding the more general picture of the wealth distribution, our model gen-
erates results similar to those reported in the literature. Workers are more con-
centrated at lower wealth levels, and there exists a signiﬁcant mass of wealthy
entrepreneurs but also a comparably large share of poorer ones. This is in line with
empirical ﬁndings by Gentry and Hubbard (2004), Hamilton (2000). Tables 3 and
5 show that on average an entrepreneur owns a multiple of the individual worker’s
wealth, and that entrepreneurs more likely stem from upper wealth classes.
Figure 1 shows the cumulative distribution of ﬁrm sizes in the intermediate
goods sector for f ∈ {0,1,¥}. Each entrepreneur is able to operate his business at
the optimal ﬁrm size (8) in case of unconstrained credit markets (f → ¥). Conse-
quently, we observe a stepwise CDF, each step corresponding to the optimal ﬁrm
size associated with one out of the ﬁve underlying possible productivity states qe,h.
Consider next the case f = 1, where entrepreneurs are able to acquire external
ﬁnancing up to maximum sum equal to their own wealth. Here, the operating
ﬁrm size is bounded from above to twice the amount of individual wealth, which
need not be the optimal ﬁrm size, especially, if the ﬁrm owner is highly productive.
Recall at this point that the optimal ﬁrm size is endogenously determined; besides
idiosyncratic random productivity also depending on factor prices, which in turn are
determined by aggregate market activities and occupational choice in the general
equilibrium.
18The ﬁrst observation is that the optimal ﬁrm sizes rise slightly for each possible
state of entrepreneurial talent qe,h. This increase in ﬁrm sizes can be ascribed to the
factor price effect. Borrowing constraints prevent the efﬁcient allocation of capital
among sectors such that too much capital is employed in the production of the ﬁnal
good. This is associated with a decline in the real interest rate, which in turn raises
the optimal ﬁrm size in the intermediate sector for each state of productivity.
The second, major observation in the credit–constrained economy is that there
exists a positive mass of entrepreneurs between each two subsequent steps of op-
timal ﬁrm sizes, and the distribution is more concentrated at smaller ﬁrm sizes.
Constraints become binding for many entrepreneurs, who have to operate their en-
terprise at a suboptimally low scale. Non–surprisingly, this effect is aggravated, if we
reduce the availability of external ﬁnancing to naught. For f = 0, steps in the CDF
almost vanish, which means that more business owners are subject to constraints.
The optimal levels of ﬁrm sizes for the different states of productivity rise even
further, due to the factor price effect. In numbers, if we compare the unrestrained
with the completely constrained economy, businesses in the entrepreneurial sector
on average operate at 48% of their respective optimal ﬁrm size.
Macroeconomic Effects Table 3 and Figure 2 summarize the results for the macroe-
conomic key variables of the calibrated baseline model. The general picture reﬂects
the outcome one would expect from credit market improvements. Aggregate output
Y, aggregate wealth holdings a, factor prices r,w and incomes, as well as welfare
increase if we relax borrowing constraints.
Figure 2 shows that, except for wealth inequality, social mobility and the entre-
preneurship rate, the response of the macroeconomic variables to a change in f is
monotonous. The overall loss in output in a perfectly constrained compared to the
unconstrained economy (f → ¥) lies at about 21%, and average wealth holdings
decline by 23%. Tightening ﬁnancial constraints goes along with a substantial drop
in economic performance. The associated welfare loss, too, is substantial. The non–
monotonic behavior of wealth inequality, social mobility and the entrepreneurship
rate is systematic and will be discussed in more detail below.
We also see from Figure 2 that the response of output, wealth, factor prices,
and welfare to a change in f is concave. The marginal gains from improving credit
markets are much higher for small values of f, especially in the range of debt–
equity ratios between 0 < f < 2, which is the empirically plausible domain. This
interval accounts for more than three–quarter of the overall output loss associated
with ﬁnancial constraints.
Given the general equilibrium nature of the underlying model, one would ex-
pect several adjustments to take place following a reduction in external ﬁnancing as
borrowing constraints become more tight. If there is only limited or no capital de-
mand from the intermediate goods industry, we observe a capital–relocation effect
between sectors. More capital is employed in the ﬁnal goods industry. This amounts
19Table 3: Simulation Results
Tightness of constraints
f → ¥ f = 1.0 f = 0
entrepreneurship rate (%) 0.201 0.197 0.185
∅ ﬁrm size total 0.964 0.839 0.699
∅ credit rationing total 0.000 0.295 0.761
∅ proﬁts total 0.278 0.281 0.281
aggregate output Y 0.253 0.232 0.200
capital input for Y KF 0.270 0.306 0.365
interest rate r 0.042 0.028 0.008
factor price ratio w/(r+d) 1.362 1.396 1.406
factor income shares labor 0.630 0.630 0.630
capital 0.149 0.131 0.110
proﬁts 0.221 0.239 0.260
∅ income workers 0.215 0.193 0.159
entrepreneurs 0.403 0.392 0.377
risk premium 0.399 0.542 0.825
∅ wealth total 0.265 0.239 0.203
workers 0.111 0.083 0.048
entrepreneurs 0.876 0.871 0.888
wealth total 0.770 0.774 0.835
inequality workers 0.655 0.669 0.779
(Gini) entrepreneurs 0.677 0.592 0.534
mobility 0.042 0.041 0.039
to shifting about 9.5% of the aggregate capital stock from the intermediate to the
ﬁnal goods sector over the entire range 0 6 f < ¥. The average excess demand for
capital in the intermediate goods industry amounts to about 110% of the average
ﬁrm size if credit markets are completely closed; see Table 3.
With diminishing marginal returns, the equilibrium interest rate r, and accord-
ingly the factor price for capital r+d, decline by almost 3.5 p. p. in both sectors of
the economy. Recalling that entrepreneurial households receive income from two
sources, proﬁts and capital incomes, the income share reﬂecting the user costs of
capital declines for any given level of individual wealth, whereas the proﬁt share
rises. Altogether, we observe a shift in the functional income distribution from
capital to proﬁt incomes of 3.9 p.p. over the entire domain of f.
The presence of credit constraints not necessarily implies that only those agents
choose to become an entrepreneur, who have sufﬁcient own wealth and borrowed
resources to operate their business at the optimal ﬁrm size k∗. These are the only
ﬁrms who actually maximize their proﬁts, whereas the constrained entrepreneurs
are forced to operate at suboptimally small business sizes. Consequently, the aver-
age ﬁrm size in the intermediate goods industry decreases substantially as ﬁnancial
20constraints become more tight, and highly productive entrepreneurs are more af-
fected by the constraints than those with a low qe. Figure 2a shows that in a com-
pletely constrained economy the average ﬁrm size only amounts to around 48% of
its optimal operating size.
The overall employment effect of tightening ﬁnancing constraints is astonish-
ingly small. The entrepreneurshiprate decreases by 1.6 p.p. over the entire range of
f. Credit constraints are an impediment to entrepreneurship, as is stated through-
out the theoretical and empirical literature; see e.g. Evans and Leighton (1989);
Evans and Jovanovic (1989); Blanchﬂower and Oswald (1998). Nevertheless, the
rather modest response of the entrepreneurship rate to an increase in credit ra-
tioning is quite surprising. Economic intuition would have suggested a more pro-
nounced reaction in occupational choice.
There are several factors explaining this result, which can mainly be traced back
to the general equilibrium nature of our approach. Credit constraints are only one
out of several determinants of occupational choice. First of all, competition between
the ﬁnal and intermediate goods sector for capital determines the equilibrium in-
terest rate, the ﬁrm size and, most importantly, expected proﬁts of the monopolistic
enterprises. The lower the user costs of capital, the higher are c.p. proﬁts, which
increase if ﬁnancial constraints become more tight (cf. Table 3). Borrowers beneﬁt
from a decrease in the interest rate, whereas lenders and capital owners in gen-
eral loose for a given capital stock. Financial constraints affect especially business
owners with little wealth. Those, for whom the distribution of future proﬁts be-
comes unfavorable, will exit the market, whereas other constrained entrepreneurs
(continue to) operate at a suboptimally low scale.
The reallocation of capital into the production of the ﬁnal good induces an
increase in the demand for intermediate goods; see eq. (5). This, together with a
reduction in the interest rate, leads to an associated rise in expected entrepreneurial
proﬁts, albeit by a mere 1.1%. The question is to what extent market exits due to
ﬁnancial constraints are compensated by market entries due to the rise in expected
proﬁts. The fraction of business owners, who are subject to constraints, increases
for smaller values of f. Here, the negative effects of ﬁnancial constraints dominate
and the entrepreneurship rate decreases.
The choice of entering into entrepreneurship, however, is also determined by
opportunity costs in terms of foregone wage income and the expected earnings dif-
ferential (‘risk premium’) between the two types of income. Last, there is also the
question of income persistence, since households continuously decide between two
lotteries and possess (at least subjective) knowledge regarding the stochastic prop-
erties of the underlying shocks. If shocks are serially correlated, a low–productivity
worker is aware of the fact that being also lowly productive in the future is a more
probable outcome than otherwise. Consequently, he might be inclined to take his
chances with entrepreneurship, knowing that his current productivity as a worker
is not related to his future productivity as a business owner.
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Figure 2: Macroeconomic Effects of a Change in f, Baseline Model
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Figure 2: Macroeconomic Effects of a Change in f, Baseline Model (cont.)
The risk premium on entrepreneurial activity more than doubles if we compare
the unconstrained to the completely credit–constrained economy, thereby providing
incentives towards entrepreneurship. A closer inspection of Figure 2 reveals the
non–monotonic behavior of the entrepreneurship rate and social mobility. If we
relax borrowing constraints, we ﬁrst observe a sharp rise in the variables for small
f < 2, but also a moderate decrease for large values of f > 7.5.
In the interval of values for f between 4–7.5, the entrepreneurship rate is al-
most constant, which is also true for the wage rate and social mobility, although
aggregate output and average ﬁrm sizes already display a more pronounced de-
crease. The environment under which occupational choice takes place does not
undergo substantial changes in the range of intermediate values for f between 4–
7.5, thereby keeping the entrepreneurship rate comparatively stable. Once ﬁnan-
cial constraints become more severe (f < 2), we observe a more pronounced shift
in employment.
Summing up: Whereas we have clear–cut substantial, negative effects of ﬁnan-
cial constraints on overall macroeconomic performance, we observe an ambiguous
response in the entrepreneurship rate. Counteracting forces on occupational choice
give rise to a non–monotonic behavior of the entrepreneurship rate. Increases in
the tightness of ﬁnancial constraints work against business ownership by limiting
ﬁrm sizes to suboptimally low levels. On the contrary, changes in the real interest
rate, expected proﬁts, and the risk premium provide incentives towards entrepren-
eurship. As turns out, the structure of the occupational lottery, especially the degree
of income persistence is crucial to the question of what force prevails in the end.
We explore this issue more deeply in Section 4.2 for an alternative calibration of
the model.
Regarding the wealth distribution, we ﬁrst observe a sharp decline in the Gini
coefﬁcient for a rise in f from 0.84 to 0.76, which is then followed by a gradual
increase in overall wealth inequality back to a value of 0.77. This non–monotonic




f = 1000 f = 1 f = 0
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
qw,1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0.49 1 1 0 0 0 0.88 1
qw,2 0 0 0.87 1 1 0 0 0.50 1 1 0 0 0 0.67 1
qw,3 0 0 0 0 0.07 0 0 0 0 0.55 0 0 0 0.08 1
qw,4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0 0 0 0 0.08
qw,5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(b) Entrepreneurs
Tightness of constraints
f = 1000 f = 1 f = 0
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
qe,1 – – 1 1 1 – – 1 1 1 – – 1 1 1
qe,2 – – 1 1 1 – – 1 1 1 – – 1 1 1
qe,3 – – 1 1 1 – – 1 1 1 – – 1 1 1
qe,4 – – 0 0 0 – – 0 0 0 – – 0 0 0
qe,5 – – 0 0 0 – – 0 0 0 – – 0 0 0
bars (–) indicate that 0% of entrepreneurs are in the associated wealth quintile
behavior of total wealth inequality can be explained, if we look at the within–
group inequality for workers and entrepreneurs respectively. Table 3 shows that
wealth becomes more unevenly distributed among workers, whereas wealth in-
equality among entrepreneurs declines.
Social Mobility We now discuss in more detail the question of how tightened ﬁ-
nancial constraints affect occupational choice and social mobility. Table 3 shows
that an increase in the tightness of ﬁnancial constraints leads to a decline in the
entrepreneurship rate by 1.6 p.p. Between 3.9 to 4.2% of the population switch
occupations in each period of time, which amounts to an exit rate of about 20% of
all ﬁrms in the intermediate goods industry. Overall mobility declines, if constraints
become more tight.
To understand mobility of entrepreneurs, we have to consider several factors.
The future occupation is determined (a) by the present level of wealth, (b) the
current draw of productivity governing present income, consumption and saving,
(c) the choice between two lotteries with unconditional probabilities governing fu-
ture income, consumption and saving, where the lottery over worker efﬁciencies is
less risky than the lottery over entrepreneurial productivities, and (d) the expected
market equilibrium of the next period, determining factor prices and factor income
differentials.
24We are especially interested in two dimensions of social mobility: Based on the
steady state distribution of agents across occupations, we ﬁrst focus on the individ-
ual level and determine the probabilities of transition between occupations in the
next period for agents in a given wealth quintile and productivity state. The associ-
ated results are displayed in Table 4. Second, we take a more aggregate viewpoint
and analyze the inﬂow of entrants into entrepreneurship and the workforce respec-
tively by decomposing the entire ﬂow with respect to the distributional character-
istics of agents regarding wealth levels and productivity classes. This enables us to
determine the probability with which switching households come from alternative
(productivity–cum–wealth) backgrounds in the actual macroeconomic equilibrium.
If we look the transition probabilities of Table 4, the picture is striking for in-
dividuals, who currently are low and medium productivity entrepreneurs. All en-
trepreneurs of the lowest three productivity states change their occupation, even if
they belong to the upper wealth quintiles. They, with certainty, will exit the market
to seek employment as a worker in the next period. This results holds irrespective
of the degree of constraint. There are no entrepreneurs in the lowest two wealth
quintiles. Rich and highly productive business owners never change their occupa-
tion.
Regarding workers we ﬁnd that generally rich workers, in particular rich and
relatively unproductive workers switch occupations in the next period. The gen-
eral mobility pattern is robust over different levels of f. The intuition behind this
result is as already outlined above. Serially correlated shocks provide agents with
a signal regarding future productivity. Since we assumed mutually uncorrelated
processes for labor efﬁciency and entrepreneurial ability, a worker can infer from a
low productivity today a probably low labor efﬁciency tomorrow, but this not nec-
essarily indicates an equally low future ability as entrepreneur, which is given by
the unconditional probability of states.
Poor workers will not enter into business ownership, independent of their pro-
ductivity. This situation becomes more severe and even stretches to the third wealth
quintile, if ﬁnancial constraints become more tight. New entrepreneurs are mainly
recruited among the group of wealthy workers. More tight credit constraints strik-
ingly decrease the probabilities of becoming an entrepreneur for poorer workers,
while the corresponding probabilities for richer workers (especially for those in the
fourth and ﬁfth quintile) increase. If ﬁnancial constraints become more tight, the
income premium for a poor worker entering entrepreneurship is smaller than for a
rich worker. We observe an increasing spread in the distribution of premiums on
proﬁts over wages, which increases transition probabilities for rich workers.
While Table 4 provides us with information regarding the transition probability
of agents who currently are in a certain wealth class and productivity state, Table 5
allows us trace back where switching households most likely come from in macroe-
conomic equilibrium in terms of productivity and wealth characteristics. A general
insight from our model is that mobility over occupations is conﬁned to agents who
25Table 5: Decomposition of Flows: Probability of Wealth/Productivity–Class Back-
ground of Switching Households
(a) Workers
Tightness of constraints
f = 1000 f = 1 f = 0
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
qw,1 0 0 0.004 0.007 0.002 0 0 0.004 0.009 0.001 0 0 0 0.008 0.004
qw,2 0 0 0.227 0.453 0.215 0 0 0.209 0.445 0.074 0 0 0 0.234 0.101
qw,3 0 0 0 0 0.093 0 0 0 0 0.252 0 0 0 0.181 0.438
qw,4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.007 0 0 0 0 0.035
qw,5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
å 0 0 0.231 0.460 0.310 0 0 0.213 0.454 0.334 0 0 0 0.423 0.578
(b) Entrepreneurs
Tightness of constraints
f = 1000 f = 1 f = 0
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
qe,1 0 0 0.015 0.009 0.002 0 0 0.013 0.008 0.005 0 0 0 0.015 0.011
qe,2 0 0 0.114 0.072 0.050 0 0 0.104 0.062 0.073 0 0 0 0.117 0.119
qe,3 0 0 0.358 0.178 0.203 0 0 0.202 0.157 0.379 0 0 0 0.246 0.492
qe,4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
qe,5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
å 0 0 0.487 0.259 0.255 0 0 0.319 0.227 0.457 0 0 0 0.378 0.622
are not (or have not been) successful in their professions. Households continuously
decide between two serially correlated lotteries. Generally speaking, they have little
incentive to stay in their occupation, if they receive a low talent shock.
Table 5 shows that, independent of wealth levels, a new entrepreneur never is
recruited from high productivity workers and vice versa. Likewise, we never observe
a low–productivity worker from the lower wealth quintiles to make an entry into
entrepreneurship. Mobility over occupations crucially depends on membership in
wealth quintiles. New entrepreneurs have been rich workers with larger probability.
Interestingly, new entrepreneurs most probably are recruited among those workers
of the two lowest productivity states in the 4th wealth quintile. Here we observe
a combination of two incentive effects: on the one hand, the poor future income
prospects of a currently low productivity; on the other hand, the attractiveness
of entrepreneurship due to the risk premium on entrepreneurial activity. Because
members of the 5th wealth quintile receive a substantial share of their income
from riskless capital investment, they are less exposed to income risk and therefore
less likely to switch occupations, even if they are comparably unproductive. In
accordance with economic intuition, it is more likely to observe rich workers to
switch occupations, if ﬁnancial constraints become more tight.
26Table 6: Wealth Distribution
Top percentiles
Gini
1% 5% 10% 20% 30%
PSID 1994 22.6 44.8 59.1 75.9 85.9 0.75
SCF 1992 29.5 53.5 66.1 79.5 87.6 0.78
f = 0 18.48 50.60 70.10 86.24 93.70 0.822
f = 1.0 17.64 47.01 64.19 80.14 88.42 0.772
f = 1000 15.76 45.39 61.96 76.99 84.64 0.729
Table 5b, displaying the probability that a new worker is recruited from a given
wealth quintile and productivity level, has zero entries in the lower two wealth
quintiles, because all entrepreneurs belong to the upper three wealth quintiles in
the macroeconomic equilibrium. A rich and highly productive entrepreneur has
no incentive to change occupations. Therefore, workers are only recruited from
low levels of entrepreneurial productivity, and the probability is increasing, if the
ﬁnancial constraints become more tight.
4.2 Alternative Calibration of the Model
We want to conclude our numerical simulations with a short discussion of an alter-
natively calibrated model. The analysis is motivated by one of the major ﬁndings
of the baseline model, namely the non–monotonic and in magnitude very modest
response of the entrepreneurship rate and social mobility to tightening ﬁnancial
constraints. We show for an empirically equally plausible calibration that the en-
trepreneurship rate actually might increase in a more constrained economy. The
implications for overall macroeconomic performance, however, remain unchanged.
A parameter crucial for the response of the entrepreneurship rate is the degree
of serial correlation in the income processes. While entrepreneurial productivity
shocks are assumed to be more persistent in the baseline model, we now postulate
identical serial correlations for both, workers and entrepreneurs, pw = pe = 0.6. We
additionally customize the rate of time preference to b = 0.89 and the variance of
entrepreneurial shocks to se = 2.0 to generate an empirically plausible interest rate
and wealth inequality, and keep the remaining model parameters; see Table 1.
Table 6 shows that the new calibration also generates a wealth distribution
which matches empirical evidence, for instance for the U.S., regarding the Gini
coefﬁcient but also with respect to the upper tail of the distribution.
Figure 3 displays selected results for the macroeconomic effects of an increase in
the tightness of constraints under the new parameterization of the model. Table 7
in the Appendix gives a summary of the numerical results. We ﬁnd that the gen-
eral pattern of how macroeconomic performance responds to tightened constraints
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Figure 3: Macroeconomic effects of a change in f, alternative calibration
prevails. The effects are mostly in magnitude. The decline in aggregate output
and average ﬁrm size is larger when compared to the baseline model. Aggregate
output drops by 35% (vs. 21% in the baseline model) and completely constrained
ﬁrms on average only make about 31% (vs. 48%) of the optimal ﬁrm size over the
entire range of f. Instead of less competition in the intermediate goods industry,
we observe an increase in the entrepreneurship rate in the constrained economy.
This, however, comes at the cost of smaller market shares and lower average proﬁts
(–25% compared to the unconstrained economy).
Most important, the non–monotonic response of the entrepreneurship rate and
social mobility is more pronounced. The entrepreneurship rate predominantly rises
for an increase in ﬁnancial constraints, and decreases moderately for very small val-
ues of f. Here, the factors encouraging entrepreneurship prevail over the negative
effects of tightened constraints.
Likewise, social mobility increases for a rise in f, and only drops sharply for
small values f < 2. For most values of f tightened ﬁnancial constraints not only
increase the entrepreneurship rate of the economy but also the ﬂuctuation between
occupations. Altogether, social mobility takes place at a much larger scale, more
than twice as much agents switching occupations when compared to the baseline
28model. The implications regarding the transition probabilities between occupations
are identical to the baseline model and therefore omitted.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we examined the effects of borrowing constraints and idiosyncratic
risks on macroeconomic performance, wealth inequality, and social mobility in a
two–sector heterogeneous agent dynamic general equilibrium model. Workers and
ﬁrm owners are subject to idiosyncratic shocks. Entrepreneurship in the interme-
diate (non–corporate) goods industry is the riskier occupation. Our comparative
static results cover a broad range for borrowing constraints, from an unrestrained
to a perfectly constrained economy.
The stationary wealth distribution generated in the model is consistent with em-
pirical ﬁndings. Entrepreneurial households own a substantial share of household
wealth and their share increases throughout the wealth distribution.
Independent of the persistence of the idiosyncratic shocks, we ﬁnd that tighten-
ing ﬁnancial constraints is accompanied by substantial losses in aggregate output,
consumption, wealth holdings, and welfare. The inefﬁcient allocation of capital
across sectors accounts for this result in the ﬁrst place and only second the associ-
ated changes in employment and the entrepreneurship rate. To the extent ﬁrms of
the intermediate goods industry are barred from participation in the credit market,
more capital is employed in the ﬁnal (corporate) goods sector. The associated de-
cline in the interest rate causes a shift in the functional income distribution towards
proﬁt incomes.
The response of the macroeconomic variables to a change in credit availability
is monotonous and concave. We ﬁnd that the marginal gains of relaxing constraints
are especially large for small (enforced) debt–equity ratios. This indicates that it
is a worthwhile question to explore in more detail the marginal gains from credit
market improvement, which at this point is left for future research.
The general equilibrium context of our model, where optimal ﬁrm sizes and the
demand for credit are determined endogenously, gives rise to interesting implica-
tions regarding the change in the entrepreneurship rate and in social mobility, as
we vary the degree of credit availability in the non–corporate sector. Contrary to
economic intuition, there is only a slight difference in magnitude between the en-
trepreneurship rates of the completely constrained and the unrestrained economy.
The overall employment effects of relaxing ﬁnancial constraints are very small. We
also observe a non–monotonic response in both the entrepreneurship rate and in
social mobility to changes in the tightness of ﬁnancial constraints.
This result can primarily be attributed to two factors: ﬁrst, the general equilib-
rium nature of our approach. While ﬁnancial constraints deter entrepreneurs from
operating at the optimal ﬁrm size, they also induce capital ﬂows between sectors
which ultimately end up in lower interest rates and higher expected proﬁts. Second,
29the degree of income persistence. Workers and entrepreneurs with high individual
productivity tend to remain in their present occupation, whereas low productivity
individuals are more likely to switch between professions. Regarding exit and en-
try rates into entrepreneurship, we ﬁnd that a lower persistence of entrepreneurial
shocks generally increases between–group mobility and also raises the entrepren-
eurship rate over a broad range of ﬁnancial constraints.
So what are the general implications of our model? The extent, to which the
industry is subject to ﬁnancial constraints and ﬁrm sizes as well as production pos-
sibilities are limited is more important for the macroeconomy as a whole, than
the question of how many entrepreneurs there are and how occupational choice
responds to a change in the tightness of constraints. Even an increase in the en-
trepreneurship rate (i.e. the number of businesses in the market) is not sufﬁcient
to prevent or mitigate the overall loss in output, consumption and welfare, if the
access to external ﬁnancing becomes increasingly difﬁcult.
There are many important issues this paper does not address. The model lacks
a fully micro–founded formulation of credit constraints and a more detailed model-
ing of ﬁnancial intermediation. Also, testing the robustness of results with respect
to varying attitudes towards risk is left for future research. So far, we assume
worker efﬁciency and entrepreneurial ability to be uncorrelated. However, as al-
ready Cagetti and De Nardi (2006a) pointed out, it is difﬁcult to measure correlated
talent shocks in the data, which to some extent justiﬁes our approach.
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A Computational Issues
The state space of wealth is approximatedby a grid of N wealth levels an for n=1,    ,N with
a1 = a and aN = ¯ k. The macroeconomic equilibrium is recursively computed. We start with
a initial guess on factor prices ˜ w, ˜ r, and the equilibrium level of employment in efﬁciency
units ˜ L. Let µ=
 
˜ w, ˜ r, ˜ L
 
denote the vector of the initial guesses. From this ﬁrst solution trial
we obtain factor proportions in the ﬁnal goods sector according to the marginal produc-
















Let kn,h(µ) denote the ﬁrm size an entrepreneur with productivity qe,h and wealth an is
able to operate at for a given extent of borrowing constraints and the initial guess µ. His
proﬁt is given by











n,h(µ) as well as Ae
n,h(µ) and Qe
n,h(µ) for n = 1,...,N and h = 1,...,H
denote the optimal policies associated with the discrete formulation of the optimization
problems (11) and (12) for the given initial guess µ on prices and employment. We charac-
terize agents by their wealth holdings an, their occupational status z, where z ∈ {w, e} and
their current productivity state qh, h = 1,...,H.
Knowing the policy functions and transition matrices for the underlying productivity
shocks, we are able to compute a stationary distribution and the probability for an agent
33to have wealth an, occupational status z and productivity state qh. Let Yn,z,h(µ) denote the
respective probability for n = 1,...,N, z = {w, e} and h = 1,...,H given the initial guess µ.
These probabilities can now be used to compute aggregate quantities. The aggregate capital






































The supply of capital to the ﬁnal goods sector is thus given by KS
F(µ)=K(µ)−KD
I (µ). Finally,















The initial solution guess represents an equilibrium only if the following conditions
hold:
(i) Labor supply in efﬁciency units must equal the initial guess, i.e.
L(µ) = ˜ L (A.1)













The algorithm for ﬁnding the equilibrium values consists of three nested loops over ˜ L, ˜ w
and ˜ r. The ﬁrst loop iteratively computes the value ˜ L which meets condition (A.1) for given
factor prices ˜ w and ˜ r. Then, factor prices ˜ w and ˜ r are adjusted according to the resulting
excess demands for labor and capital according to conditions (A.2) and (A.3). The whole
procedure is repeated until the equilibrium conditions (A.1) to (A.3) are satisﬁed, except
for a tolerably small approximation error.
To implement the algorithm, we used the programming language C++. The underlying
source code and the data are available from the authors upon request.
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Table 7: Simulation results
Tightness of constraints
f → ¥ f = 1.0 f = 0
entrepreneurship rate (%) 0.193 0.207 0.207
∅ ﬁrm size total 0.474 0.294 0.209
∅ credit rationing total 0.000 0.299 0.459
∅ proﬁts total 0.136 0.119 0.104
ﬁnal goods sector Y 0.119 0.097 0.078
capital input for Y KF (%) 0.230 0.352 0.415
interest rate r 0.041 0.017 0.003
factor price ratio w/(r+d) 0.630 0.637 0.596
factor labor 0.630 0.630 0.630
income capital 0.149 0.114 0.097
shares proﬁts 0.221 0.256 0.273
∅ income workers 0.103 0.081 0.064
entrepreneurs 0.183 0.155 0.133
risk premium 0.464 0.553 0.665
∅ wealth total 0.126 0.094 0.074
workers 0.075 0.038 0.018
entrepreneurs 0.338 0.308 0.288
wealth total 0.729 0.772 0.822
inequality workers 0.697 0.736 0.794
(Gini) entrepreneurs 0.602 0.578 0.523
mobility 0.121 0.116 0.070
35Working Paper Series in Economics 
(see www.leuphana.de/vwl/papers for a complete list) 
No.102:  Helmut Fryges & Joachim Wagner: Exports and Profitability – First Evidence for German 
Manufacturing Firms. October 2008 
No.101:  Heike Wetzel: Productivity Growth in European Railways: Technological Progress, 
Efficiency Change and Scale Effects. October 2008 
No.100:  Henry Sabrowski: Inflation Expectation Formation of German Consumers: Rational or 
Adaptive? October 2008 
No.99:  Joachim Wagner: Produktdifferenzierung in deutschen Industrieunternehmen 1995 – 
2004: Ausmaß und Bestimmungsgründe, Oktober 2008 
No.98:  Jan Kranich: Agglomeration, vertical specialization, and the strength of industrial 
linkages, September 2008 
No.97:  Joachim Wagner: Exports and firm characteristics - First evidence from Fractional Probit 
Panel Estimates, August 2008 
No.96:   Nils Braakmann: The smoking wage penalty in the United Kingdom: Regression and 
matching evidence from the British Household Panel Survey, August 2008 
No.95:  Joachim Wagner: Exportaktivitäten und Rendite in niedersächsischen 
Industrieunternehmen, August 2008 
[publiziert in: Statistische Monatshefte Niedersachsen 62 (2008), 10,552-560] 
No.94:  Joachim Wagner: Wirken sich Exportaktivitäten positiv auf die Rendite von deutschen 
Industrieunternehmen aus?, August 2008 
[publiziert in: Wirtschaftsdienst, 88 (2008) 10, 690-696] 
No.93:  Claus Schnabel & Joachim Wagner: The aging of the unions in West Germany,  
1980-2006, August 2008 
[forthcoming in: Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik] 
No.92:  Alexander Vogel and Stefan Dittrich: The  German turnover tax statistics panels, August 
2008 
[forthcoming in: Schmollers Jahrbuch 128 (2008)] 
No.91:  Nils Braakmann: Crime does pay (at least when it’s violent!) – On the compensating 
wage differentials of high regional crime levels, July 2008 
No.90:  Nils Braakmann: Fields of training, plant characteristics and the gender wage gap in 
entry wages among skilled workers – Evidence from German administrative data, July 
2008 
No.89:  Alexander Vogel: Exports productivity in the German business services sector: First 
evidence from the Turnover Tax Statistics panel, July 2008 
No.88:   Joachim Wagner: Improvements and future challenges for the research infrastructure in 
the field Firm Level Data, June 2008 
No.87:  Markus Groth: A review of the German mandatory deposit for one-way drinks packaging 
and drinks packaging taxes in Europe, June 2008 
No.86:  Heike Wetzel: European railway deregulation. The influence of regulatory ans 
environmental conditions on efficiency, May 2008 
     
No.85:  Nils Braakmann: Non scholae, sed vitae discimus! - The importance of fields of study for 
the gender wage gap among German university graduates during market entry and the 
first years of their careers, May 2008 
No.84:  Markus Groth: Private ex-ante transaction costs for repeated biodiversity conservation 
auctions: A case study, May 2008 
No.83:  Jan Kranich: R&D and the agglomeration of industries, April 2008 
No.82:  Alexander Vogel: Zur Exporttätigkeit unternehmensnaher Dienstleister in Niedersachsen - 
Erste Ergebnisse zu Export und Produktivität auf Basis des Umsatzsteuerstatistikpanels, 
April 2008 
No.81:  Joachim Wagner: Exporte und Firmenerfolg: Welche Firmen profitieren wie vom 
internationalen Handel?, März 2008 
No.80:  Stefan Baumgärtner: Managing increasing environmental risks through agro-biodiversity 
and agri-environmental policies, March 2008 
No.79:  Thomas Huth: Die Quantitätstheorie des Geldes – Eine keynesianische Reformulierung, 
März 2008 
No.78:  Markus Groth: An empirical examination of repeated auctions for biodiversity 
conservation contracts, March 2008 
No.77:  Nils Braakmann: Intra-firm wage inequality and firm performance – First evidence from 
German linked employer-employee-data, February 2008 
No.76:   Markus Groth: Perspektiven der Nutzung von Methanhydraten als Energieträger – Eine 
Bestandsaufnahme, Februar 2008 
No.75:  Stefan Baumgärtner, Christian Becker, Karin Frank, Birgit Müller & Christian Quaas: 
Relating the philosophy and practice of ecological economics. The role of concepts, 
models, and case studies in inter- and transdisciplinary sustainability research, January 
2008 
[publisched in: Ecological Economics 67 (2008), 3 , 384-393] 
No.74:  Thorsten Schank, Claus Schnabel & Joachim Wagner: Higher wages in exporting firms: 
Self-selection, export effect, or both? First evidence from German linked employer-
employee data, January 2008 
No.73:  Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre: Forschungsbericht 2007, Januar 2008 
No.72:  Christian Growitsch and Heike Wetzel:Testing for economies of scope in European 
railways: An efficiency analysis, December 2007 
[revised version of Working Paper No. 29,  
forthcoming in: Journal of Transport Economics and Policy] 
No.71:  Joachim Wagner, Lena Koller and Claus Schnabel: Sind mittelständische Betriebe der 
Jobmotor der deutschen Wirtschaft?, Dezember 2007 
[publiziert in: Wirtschftsdienst 88 (2008), 2, 130-135] 
No.70:  Nils Braakmann: Islamistic terror, the war on Iraq and the job prospects of Arab men in 
Britain: Does a country’s direct involvement matter?, December 2007 
No.69:  Maik Heinemann: E-stability and stability learning in models with asymmetric information, 
December 2007 
No.68:  Joachim Wagner: Exporte und Produktivität in Industriebetrieben – Niedersachsen im 
interregionalen und internationalen Vergleich, Dezember 2007 
      
No.67:  Stefan Baumgärtner and Martin F. Quaas: Ecological-economic viability as a criterion of 
strong sustainability under uncertainty, November 2007 
No.66:  Kathrin Michael: Überbrückungsgeld und Existenzgründungszuschuss – Ergebnisse einer 
schriftlichen Befragung drei Jahre nach Gründungsbeginn, November 2007 
No.65:  The International Study Group on Export and Productivity: Exports and Productivity – 
Comparable Evidence for 14 Countries, November 2007 
[forthcoming in: Review of World Economics 144 (2008), 4] 
No.64:  Lena Koller, Claus Schnabel und Joachim Wagner: Freistellung von Betriebsräten – Eine 
Beschäftigungsbremse?, November 2007 
[publiziert in: Zeitschrift für Arbeitsmarktforschung, 41 (2008), 2/3, 305-326] 
No.63:  Anne-Kathrin Last: The Monetary Value of Cultural Goods: A Contingent Valuation Study 
of the Municipal Supply of Cultural Goods in Lueneburg, Germany, October 2007 
No.62:  Thomas Wein und Heike Wetzel: The Difficulty to Behave as a (regulated) Natural 
Monopolist – The Dynamics of Electricity Network Access Charges in Germany 2002 to 
2005, September 2007 
No.61:  Stefan Baumgärtner und Martin F. Quaas: Agro-biodiversity as natural insurance and the 
development of financial insurance markets, September 2007 
[published in: A. Kontoleon, U. Pascual and M. Smale (eds.): Agrobiodiversity, 
conservation and economic development, Routledge, London, 293-317] 
No.60:  Stefan Bender, Joachim Wagner, Markus Zwick: KombiFiD - Kombinierte Firmendaten für 
Deutschland, September 2007 
No.59:  Jan Kranich: Too much R&D? - Vertical differentiation in a model of monopolistic 
competition, August 2007 
No.58:  Christian Papilloud und Ingrid Ott: Convergence or mediation? Experts of vulnerability 
and the vulnerability of experts’ discourses on nanotechnologies – a case study,  
July 2007 
[published in: European Journal of Social Science Research 21 (2008), 1, 41-64] 
No.57:  Ingrid Ott und Susanne Soretz: Governmental activity, integration and agglomeration, 
July 2007 
[published in: ICFAI Journal of Managerial Economics 5 (2008), 2, 28-47] 
No.56:  Nils Braakmann: Struktur und Erfolg von Ich-AG-Gründungen: Ergebnisse einer Umfrage 
im Arbeitsagenturbezirk Lüneburg, Juli 2007 
[revidierte Fassung erscheint in: Richter, J., Schöning, S. & Wetzel, H., Mittelstand 2008. 
Aktuelle Forschungsbeiträge zu gesellschaftlichen und finanzwirtschaftlichen 
Herausforderungen, Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2008] 
No.55:  Nils Braakmann: Differences in the earnings distribution of self- and dependent employed 
German men – evidence from a quantile regression decomposition analysis, July 2007 
No.54:  Joachim Waagner: Export entry, export exit, and productivity in German Manufacturing 
Industries, June 2007 








    
No.53:  Nils Braakmann: Wirkungen der Beschäftigungspflicht schwerbehinderter Arbeitnehmer – 
Erkenntnisse aus der Einführung des „Gesetzes zur Bekämpfung der Arbeitslosigkeit 
Schwerbehinderter“, Juni 2007 
[revidierte Fassung erscheint in: Zeitschrift für Arbeitsmarktforschung/ Journal for Labour 
Market Research 41 (2008),1] 
No.52:  Jan Kranich und Ingrid Ott: Regionale Spitzentechnologie auf internationalen Märkten, 
Juni 2007 
[erscheint in: Merz, J. und Schulte, R. (Hrsg.): Neue Ansätze der MittelstandsForschung, 
Münster, 2007] 
No.51:  Joachim Wagner: Die Forschungspotenziale der Betriebspaneldaten 
des Monatsberichts im Verarbeitenden Gewerbe, Mai 2007 
[erscheint in: AStA – Wirtschafts- und Sozialwirtschaftliches Archiv] 
No.50:  Stefan Baumgärtner, Frank Jöst und Ralph Winkler: Optimal dynamic scale and structure 
of a multi-pollution economy, May 2007 
[forthcoming in: Ecological Economics] 
No.49:  Helmut Fryges und Joachim Wagner: Exports and productivity growth – First evidence 
from a continuous treatment approach, May 2007 
[forthcoming in: Review of World Economics] 
No.48:  Ulrich Kaiser und Joachim Wagner: Neue Möglichkeiten zur Nutzung vertraulicher 
amtlicher Personen- und Firmendaten, April 2007 
[publiziert in: Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik 9 (2008), 3, 329-349] 
No.47:  Joachim Wagner: Jobmotor Mittelstand? Arbeitsplatzdynamik und Betriebsgröße in der 
westdeutschen Industrie, April 2007 
[publiziert in: Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung, 76 (2007), 3, 76-87] 
No.46:  Christiane Clemens und Maik Heinemann: Credit Constraints, Idiosyncratic Risks, and 
the Wealth Distribution in a Heterogenous Agent Model, March 2007 
No.45:  Jan Kranich: Biotechnologie und Internationalisierung. Ergebnisse der Online-Befragung, 
März 2007 
No.44:  Joachim Wagner: Entry, exit and productivity. Empirical results for German manufacturing 
industries, March 2007 
[forthcoming in: German Economic Review] 
No.43:  Joachim Wagner: Productivity and Size of the Export Market Evidence for West and East 
German Plants, 2004, March 2007 
[publiziert in: Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik, 227 (2007), 4, 403-408] 
No.42:  Joachim Wagner: Why more West than East German firms export, March 2007 
No.41:  Joachim Wagner: Exports and Productivity in Germany, March 2007 
[publiziert in: Applied Economics Quarterly 53 (2007), 4, 353-373] 
No.40:  Lena Koller, Klaus Schnabel und Joachim Wagner: Schwellenwerte im Arbeitsrecht. 
Höhere Transparenz und Effizienz durch Vereinheitlichung, Februar 2007 
[publiziert in: Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, 8 (2007), 3, 242-255] 
No.39:  Thomas Wein und Wiebke B. Röber: Sind ausbildende Handwerksbetriebe 
erfolgreicher?, Januar 2007 
No.38:  Institut für Volkswirtschaft: Forschungsbericht 2006, Januar 2007 
      
No.37:  Nils Braakmann: The impact of September 11
th, 2001 on the job prospects of foreigners 
with Arab background – Evidence from German labor market data, January 2007 
No.36:  Jens Korunig: Regulierung des Netzmonopolisten durch Peak-load Pricing?, Dezember 
2006 
No.35:  Nils Braakmann: Die Einführung der fachkundigen Stellungnahme bei der Ich-AG, 
November 2006 
[erscheint in: Schulte, Reinhard: Neue Ansätze der MittelstandsForschung, Münster etc.: 
Lit, 2008] 
No.34:  Martin F. Quaas and Stefan Baumgärtner: Natural vs. financial insurance in the 
management of public-good ecosystems, October 2006 
[published in: Ecological Economics 65 (2008), 2, 397-406] 
No.33:  Stefan Baumgärtner and Martin F. Quaas: The Private and Public Insurance Value of 
Conservative Biodiversity Management, October 2006 
No.32:  Ingrid Ott and Christian Papilloud: Converging institutions. Shaping the relationships 
between nanotechnologies, economy and society, October 2006 
[published in: Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society 2007 (27), 4, 455-466] 
No.31:  Claus Schnabel and Joachim Wagner: The persistent decline in unionization in western 
and eastern Germany, 1980-2004: What can we learn from a decomposition analysis?, 
October 2006 
[published in: Industrielle Beziehungen/The German Journal of Industrial Relations 14 
(2007), 118-132] 
No.30:  Ingrid Ott and Susanne Soretz: Regional growth strategies: fiscal versus institutional 
governmental policies, September 2006 
[published in: Economic Modelling 25 (1008), 605-622] 
No.29:  Christian Growitsch and Heike Wetzel: Economies of Scope in European Railways: An 
Efficiency Analysis, July 2006 
No.28:  Thorsten Schank, Claus Schnabel and Joachim Wagner: Do exporters really pay higher 
wages? First evidence from German linked employer-employee data, June 2006 
[published in in: Journal of International Economics 72 (2007), 1, 52-74] 
No.27:  Joachim Wagner:  Markteintritte, Marktaustritte und Produktivität 
Empirische Befunde zur Dynamik in der Industrie, März 2006 
[publiziert in: AStA – Wirtschafts- und Sozialwirtschaftliches Archiv 1 (2007), 3, 193-203] 
No.26:  Ingrid Ott and Susanne Soretz: Governmental activity and private capital adjustment, 
March 2006 
[forthcoming in: Icfai Journal of Managerial Economics] 
No.25:  Joachim Wagner: International Firm Activities and Innovation: 
Evidence from Knowledge Production Functions for German Firms, March 2006 
[published in: The Icfai Journal of Knowledge Management VI (2008), 2, 47-62] 
No.24:  Ingrid Ott und Susanne Soretz: Nachhaltige Entwicklung durch endogene 
Umweltwahrnehmung, März 2006 
publiziert in: Clemens, C., Heinemann, M. & Soretz, S., Auf allen Märkten zu Hause 




    
No.23:  John T. Addison, Claus Schnabel, and Joachim Wagner: The (Parlous) State of German 
Unions, February 2006 
[published in: Journal of Labor Research 28 (2007), 3-18] 
No.22:  Joachim Wagner, Thorsten Schank, Claus Schnabel, and John T. Addison: Works 
Councils, Labor Productivity and Plant Heterogeneity: First Evidence from Quantile 
Regressions, February 2006 
[published in: Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik 226 (2006), 505 - 518] 
No.21:  Corinna Bunk: Betriebliche Mitbestimmung vier Jahre nach der Reform des BetrVG: 
Ergebnisse der 2. Befragung der Mitglieder des Arbeitgeberverbandes Lüneburg 
Nordostniedersachsen, Februar 2006 
No.20:  Jan Kranich:  The Strength of Vertical Linkages, July 2006 
No.19:  Jan Kranich und Ingrid Ott: Geographische Restrukturierung internationaler  
Wertschöpfungsketten – Standortentscheidungen von KMU aus regionalökonomischer 
Perspektive, Februar 2006 
[publiziert in: Merz, J. und Schulte, R. (Hrsg.): Fortschritte in der MittelstandsForschung, 
Münster, 2006, 113-129] 
No.18:  Thomas Wein und Wiebke B. Röber: Handwerksreform 2004 – Rückwirkungen auf das 
Ausbildungsverhalten Lüneburger Handwerksbetriebe?, Februar 2006 
No.17:  Wiebke B. Röber und Thomas Wein: Mehr Wettbewerb im Handwerk durch die 
Handwerksreform?, Februar 2006 
No.16:  Joachim Wagner: Politikrelevante Folgerungen aus Analysen mit wirtschaftsstatistischen 
Einzeldaten der Amtlichen Statistik, Februar 2006 
[publiziert in: Schmollers Jahrbuch 126 (2006) 359-374]  
No.15:  Joachim Wagner: Firmenalter und Firmenperformance 
Empirische Befunde zu Unterschieden zwischen jungen und alten Firmen  
in Deutschland, September 2005 
[publiziert in: Lutz Bellmann und Joachim Wagner (Hrsg.), Betriebsdemographie 
(Beiträge zur Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung, Band 305), Nürnberg: IAB der BA,  
83-111]  
No.14:  Joachim Wagner: German Works Councils and Productivity: 
First Evidence from a Nonparametric Test, September 2005 
[published in: Applied Economics Letters 115 (2008), 727-730] 
No.13:  Lena Koller, Claus Schnabel und Joachim Wagner: Arbeitsrechtliche Schwellenwerte und 
betriebliche Arbeitsplatzdynamik: Eine empirische Untersuchung am Beispiel des 
Schwerbehindertengesetzes, August 2005 
[publiziert in: Zeitschrift für ArbeitsmarktForschung/ Journal for Labour Market Research 
39 (2006), 181-199]  
No.12:  Claus Schnabel and Joachim Wagner:  Who are the workers who never joined a union? 
Empirical evidence from Germany, July 2005 
[published in: Industrielle Beziehungen/ The German Journal of Industrial Relations 13 






    
No.11:  Joachim Wagner:  Exporte und Produktivität in mittelständischen Betrieben 
Befunde aus der niedersächsischen Industrie (1995 – 2004), June 2005 
[publiziert in: Niedersächsisches Landesamt für Statistik, Statistische Berichte 
Niedersachsen, Sonderausgabe: Tagung der NLS am 9. März 2006, Globalisierung und 
regionale Wirtschaftsentwicklung - Datenlage und Datenbedarf in Niedersachsen. 
Hannover, Niedersächsisches Landesamt für Statistik, Juli 2006, 18 – 29] 
No.10:  Joachim Wagner:  Der Noth gehorchend, nicht dem eignen Trieb.  
Nascent Necessity and Opportunity Entrepreneurs in Germany.  
Evidence from the Regional Entrepreneurship Monitor (REM), May 2005 
[published in: RWI: Mitteilungen. Quarterly 54/ 55 (2003/04), 287-303  
{published June 2006}] 
No. 9:  Gabriel Desgranges and Maik Heinemann: Strongly Rational Expectations Equilibria with 
Endogenous Acquisition of Information, March 2005 
No. 8:  Joachim Wagner: Exports, Foreign Direct Investment, and Productivity: Evidence from 
German Firm Level Data, March 2005 
[published in: Applied Economics Letters 13 (2006), 347-349] 
No. 7:  Thomas Wein: Associations’ Agreement and the Interest of the Network Suppliers – The 
Strategic Use of Structural Features, March 2005 
No. 6:  Christiane Clemens and Maik Heinemann: On the Effects of Redistribution on Growth 
and Entrepreneurial Risk-Taking, March 2005 
No. 5:  Christiane Clemens and Maik Heinemann: Endogenous Redistributive Cycles – An 
overlapping Generations Approach to Social Conflict and Cyclical Growth, March 2005 
No. 4:  Joachim Wagner: Exports and Productivity: A Survey of the Evidence from Firm Level 
Data, March 2005 
[published  in: The World Economy 30 (2007), 1, 60-82] 
No. 3:  Thomas Wein and Reimund Schwarze: Is the Market Classification of Risk Always 
Efficient? - Evidence from German Third Party Motor Insurance, March 2005 
No. 2:   Ingrid Ott and Stephen J. Turnovsky: Excludable and Non-Excludable Public Inputs: 
Consequences for Economic Growth, June 2005 (Revised version)  
[published in: Economica 73 (2006), 292, 725-742 
also published as CESifo Working Paper 1423]  
No. 1:  Joachim Wagner: Nascent and Infant Entrepreneurs in Germany.  
Evidence from the Regional Entrepreneurship Monitor (REM), March 2005 
[erschienen in: Joachim Merz, Reinhard Schulte (Hrsg.), Neue Ansätze der 
MittelstandsForschung, Berlin: Lit Verlag 2008, S.395-411] 
 